After several months of growing tensions with Israel and the US, and repeated rumours of an imminent military strike on its nuclear facilities, Iran has signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Russia. The signing of the Agreement, together with the inauguration as US President of Donald Trump who has made it clear that he does not want to participate in any new wars in the Middle East, seems certain to reduce tensions in the region.
These are longstanding, dating from the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which overthrew the US-backed Pahlavi dynasty and established the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This saw the imposition of massive US sanctions on Iran, which have continued.
After years of contentious negotiations moderated by the IAEA, Iran signed the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 group of countries (the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) under which it agreed to limit its nuclear development programme in return for the lifting of sanctions. IN Security Council sanctions on Iran were lifted but sanctions imposed by the US and European countries continued. In response to the US’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018, Iran resumed nuclear construction and enrichment activities after notifying the IAEA. As a result, US and European sanctions were tightened further.
While limited IAEA inspections of its nuclear activities have continued, interactions with the IAEA have been reduced while Iran’s nuclear development has continued apace despite the sanctions, with Israel repeatedly alleging that Tehran was on the verge of developing nuclear weapons. Tensions reached a peak in October, when Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel in response to a series of assassinations of prominent Iranian and Palestinian figures. This prompted additional US sanctions and further Israeli threats. In face of this, Iranian parliamentarians called on the Supreme National Security Council to review the country’s defence doctrine to remove the ban on developing nuclear weapons. However, Iran, which signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, ratifying it in 1970, has maintained the ban.
The 47-article Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with Russia is indeed comprehensive and detailed, covering every aspect of geopolitics as well as defence and economic affairs including energy. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Russian President Vladimir Putin he believed the two countries could finalise agreements on nuclear power development as the two leaders during talks in Moscow ahead of agreement being signed on 17 January. This was reflected in Article 23 of the treaty, which stated: “The Contracting Parties shall promote the development of long-term and mutually beneficial relations in order to implement joint projects in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the construction of nuclear power facilities.”
Peripheral support for this came in other articles which dealt with arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and ensuring international security (Article 10); opposition to international sanctions whereby Iran and Russia agreed to “coordinate efforts and support multilateral initiatives aimed at eliminating the practice of applying such measures in international relations” (Article 19); measures to enhance the energy security through the efficient use of fuel and energy resources (Article 22); implementation of joint scientific and technical projects (Article 30); and the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies and the implementation of environmental protection measures (Article 39).
Addressing a press conference after the signing, Putin said the Agreement “sets ambitious goals and sets out guidelines for deepening bilateral cooperation in the long-term perspective in politics and security, trade, investment, and humanitarian fields” and “is aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the stable and sustainable development of Russia and Iran”. He described the talks with Pezeshkian as “very useful and meaningful” and “really constructive and friendly”.
He noted: “The most important area of Russian-Iranian cooperation is energy. The flagship joint project for the construction of two new Bushehr NPP units by Rosatom is progressing. Its implementation will certainly make a significant contribution to strengthening Iran’s energy security, stimulate further growth of the national economy, and provide Iranian households and industrial enterprises with inexpensive and environmentally friendly electricity.”
In response to a question he said: “We have a huge project in nuclear energy. One unit is already operating, and it is operating successfully. We are now discussing the possibility of building additional units. Yes, everything is shifting in time a little there, due to calculations, payments. Anyway, the work is ongoing, it is moving forward. Thousands of people are already working at these facilities. And about 80% of the construction work is being carried out by local companies.”
Currently, the most important joint project in the nuclear energy sector is the Bushehr NPP in southern Iran. Its construction began in 1975 by a West German concern, but was interrupted in 1979 after the start of the Islamic Revolution. In 1992, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to continue construction of the plant. In September 2011, the first power unit was connected to the grid, and its transfer to Iran took place in September 2013. In November 2014, a contract was signed for the construction of the second stage of the NPP (units 2&3) which are planned for operation in 2025 and 2027. Earlier in January, the Iranian authorities announced that the construction of units 2&3 was 17% complete.
Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev told reporters in the Kremlin, following the Russian-Iranian talks, that Iran intends to cooperate with Rosatom on both small and large NPPs. “Today, our Iranian colleagues and partners requested the development of cooperation with respect to small nuclear power plants and a new site for large NPPs,” he said. He added that talks on the construction of another large NPP in Iran will begin in the near future.
He added that work on small NPPs “requires adjustment at the level of intergovernmental agreements, and we have already sent our partners the relevant protocol”. As to a new site for a large plant “it requires very serious and deep negotiations, which we will begin in the near future”. He noted that unit 1 of the Bushehr NPP has generated more than 70bn kWh of electricity to date. Likhachev stressed that, despite ongoing sanctions and pressure, the construction of the second and third units continues.
Earlier, in January, in face of continued threats from Israel, the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) launched massive military drills in the central province of Isfahan to demonstrate protection of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. A senior Iranian military commander also said Iran would stage massive security and anti-terror operations across the country for the next two months.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2024 that Iran was ready to restart talks on reactivating the JCPOA. “If the deal’s commitments are implemented fully and in good faith, dialogue on other issues can follow,” he said.
Iran is currently holding nuclear talks with three European countries based on the JCPOA, Iranian spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry Esmail Baghaei told a press conference in Tehran on 20 January. The first round of talks between the deputy foreign ministers of Iran and three European countries (the UK, France, and Germany) was held in Geneva on 29 November 2024 followed by a second round on 13-14 January.
However, the JCPOA expires in October 2025. Vladimir Sazhin, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences told Vedmosti that there is no longer any hope for the revival of the JCPOA in its previous form. He pointed out that the level of development of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure has grown significantly compared with 2018. For these reasons, any new negotiations will have to take into account the current conditions. The Iran-Russia Agreement has undoubtedly changed the parameters of the situation, not least Article 10, which undermines the effect of any future sanctions that may be imposed on Iran.
