Mohammad Reza Kardan, head of the Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority told NEI during the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference in Vienna that Iran, as a developing country, needs energy and that it aims to increase the contribution of nuclear energy. “We are aiming for 20,000 MWe by 2040 and this was approved before the 1979 revolution,” he said. “We need to ensure energy security. We have had a very bad experience relying on other countries. After the revolution all contracts were cancelled. The first lesson we learned was how to rely on ourselves. We learned a lot of lessons after the revolution. No-one would help us – we had to depend on ourselves to ensure our energy security, which is related to our national security.”
He added; “As a regulator we have limited resources like all countries in attracting people to this sector. Another problem is communication with other regulators – it is important to learn from each other but due to sanctions there is very little communication, and we can’t learn from others.”
Kardan’s comments follow those of Iranian Vice President and head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), Mohammad Eslami, who told Iranian media that Iran is producing the world’s highest-quality heavy water and its derivatives, highlighting the significant advancements in Iran’s nuclear technology. He also noted that the Bushehr NPP is among the best performing facilities globally.
Earlier in a briefing to members of the Iranian parliament’s Committee on Plan, Budget & Audit, Eslami said electricity generated at Bushehr in the past 10 years was worth twice the investment the government has made to build the plant. He added that AEOI is also in the midst of a two-year project to find sites for new NPPs, adding that construction of the plants will take 5-7 years. He added that AEOI has extensive plans to further develop uranium mining and production of uranium oxide concentrate (yellowcake) to provide fuel for Bushehr and other NPPs “given that we are under sanctions and [yellowcake] sale to us is banned”.
Efforts to restrict nuclear access
Eslami emphasised the significant progress in nuclear technology development despite numerous obstacles, particularly international efforts to block Iran’s access to advanced technologies. These have included several direct attacks on its nuclear facilities that have been attributed to Israel. These include the apparent cyberattack at the electricity distribution network of Shahid Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan uranium enrichment centre in Natanz in 2021 causing loss of power in the area and a fire that reportedly damaged a number of centrifuges. In 2009, the Stuxnet computer virus, thought to have been developed by the USA and Israel, was also used to target industrial control systems at the Natanz facility, reportedly destroying almost one-fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, and an explosion in July 2020 which destroyed Iran’s centrifuge assembly facility.
As a result of decades of sanctions and direct attacks on its nuclear programme, most of Iran’s key nuclear facilities have been constructed deep underground. This is just one of the factors complicating any plan to attack these sites.
Nonetheless, the construction of the Bushehr NPP illustrates the impact of the years of sanctions on Iran’s nuclear programme. In 1975, German Kraftwerk Union (KWU), a joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG-Telefunken and work began the same year. The two 1,196 MWe reactors were referenced to unit B of Germany’s Biblis NPP. Following the Islamic revolution, which led to a crisis in Iran’s relations with the West and the imposition of sanctions, KWU withdrew from the project with the reactor 50% and 85% complete. Shortly afterwards, Iraq invaded Iran and the reactors were damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes.
From the mid-1980s, Iran asked several nuclear suppliers about completing unit 1, without success. Then, in 1992, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to continue the construction of the station. The project challenging in view of continued sanctions and in terms of technology which involved integrating German and Russian technology. German engineers had left behind a total of 80,000 pieces of equipment and structural elements, with little technical documentation. The West German government refused to grant Siemens (KWU) an export licence for the undelivered components held in storage.
Unit 1 was finally connected to the grid in September 2011 and in 2014, a contract was signed for the construction of the second and third units with VVER-1000 reactors. Construction of unit 2 began in 2019 and Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev recently told the Russia-1 channel that installation of the melt trap would be completed by the end of 2024. He added that work was underway on both units 2&3.
Fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) was also impacted by the sanctions. After the Iranian Revolution, the US cut off the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the TRR, which forced the reactor to be shut down for a number of years. The TRR core was converted to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in 1993, which was initially supplied by Argentina. In 2009 the TRR was expected to run out of fuel within the following few years and asked the IAEA to facilitate supplies. Various schemes were drawn up but never implemented, after which Iran began its own enrichment programme to provide fuel for the TRR. Development of its already sophisticated nuclear programme continued.
Iranian nuclear development
The commercial launch of Bushehr unit 2 is planned for 2029 while first concrete for unit 3 should take place before the end of the year. To achieve the goal of 20 GW of nuclear power by 2040 sites are being selected for several more stations. AEOI has already announced the start of work a new four-unit NPP at Sirik in the southern coastal province of Hormozgan.
As to the 5 MW pool-type TRR, new areas of application have been developed including staining precious stones, neutron visualisation, as well as testing various types of nuclear fuel. TRR has been operating since 1967 for basic research and radioisotope production. To replace this reactor, starting in 2022, a new 10 MW research reactor, IRR10, has been built in Isfahan to test fuel and produce radioisotopes. It will be the basis for an international nuclear science and technology training centre.
Iran’s research reactors are also used for medicine, pest control, radiation exposure, disinfection and food safety. Currently, there are six radiation plants and six more are being built to reduce 30% of agricultural losses and increase food safety. Among other applications of radiation technologies is the plant breeding department that develops cotton, soy, rice, tangerines and ornamental plants, as well as new organic fertilisers and the use of the sterile insect methods of pest control.
AEOI also described development of the nuclear fuel cycle. Currently, Iran has uranium mining facilities in Hoshuomi, Narigan and Saganda, as well as the Ardakan Yellow Kek Plant and the Sagand Yellow Kick Patching Plant. In the next five years, it is planned to develop and manufacture fuel for research reactors in Tehran, Isfahan, and the upgraded reactor in Arak as well as theNPP IR-300 NPP being built at Darkhovin in Khuzestan.
Future plans include:
- Aerial exploration of uranium in more than half of Iran;
- Design and construction of a uranium ore processing plant and a yellow cake production unit (in situ leaching);
- Design and construction of a conversion plant for the production of uranium oxide and UF6;
- Design and construction of a plant for the production of zirconium cladding, fuel lines and fuel assemblies for light water reactors and plate fuel for TRR, including quality control and pre-radiation tests;
- Design and construction of infrastructure for irradiating fuel samples and testing after exposure.
- Iran is also developing accident tolerant nuclear fuel and is considering the design and construction of pre-burial and near-surface disposal facilities for low- and medium-level radioactive waste.
International agreements
After years of contentious negotiations moderated by the IAEA, Iran signed the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 group of countries (the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) under which it agreed to limit its nuclear development programme in return for the lifting of sanctions. However, in response to the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018, Iran resumed nuclear construction and enrichment activities after notifying the IAEA.
While limited IAEA inspections of its nuclear activities have continued, interactions with the IAEA have been reduced while Iran’s nuclear development has continued apace. During the recent IAEA General Conference, the AEOI outlined its future plans at a side event, 50 Years of Nuclear Technology in Iran: Success Stories. According to AEOI officials, three nuclear power reactors are currently under construction in Iran and site and technology selection for another is underway. Further nuclear fuel cycle and research reactor development is also planned.
IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi recently held talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, one of the key architects of the 2015 JCPOA. “What I see is an expressed willingness to re-engage with us in a more meaningful fashion,” Grossi told Reuters afterwards.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in his speech to the UN General Assembly indicated that Iran was ready to restart talks on reactivating the JCPOA. “If the deal’s commitments are implemented fully and in good faith, dialogue on other issues can follow,” he said.
A series of Western-sponsored IAEA board resolutions ordering Iran to cooperate urgently with investigations into the uranium traces and calling on it to reverse its barring of inspectors have served only to make Iran further reduce co-operation with the Agency.
Asked about the prospects of a revival of nuclear talks, Grossi said the preparatory work needed to start now, notably for the IAEA to get the necessary clarity on Iran’s activities since it reduced cooperation with the agency. “I think we need to, or the ambition should be to get results in a different way, because the old way is simply not going to be possible anymore,” he said.
Vladimir Sazhin, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences told Vedmosti that there is no longer any hope for the revival of the JCPOA in its previous form. He pointed out that the level of development of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure has grown significantly compared with 2018, and that the JCPOA formally ends in 2025. For these reasons, new negotiations will have to take into account the current conditions.
He noted that the Iranian economy and its socio-political situation are still heavily impacted by sanctions. In return for their removal, Tehran will agree not to create nuclear weapons, but will not dismantle the centrifuges already built or destroy its stockpiles of enriched uranium. However, Sazhin does not believe that any serious negotiations can take place before the inauguration of the new US president in January 2025 and that for now there can only be some “intelligence” contacts.
However, any hopes of reviving the JCPOA are on now hold and possibly dead. After 16 months of indirect US-Iranian talks, with the EU shuttling between the parties, talks ended in September 2022 when the US pulled out of the negotiations and tightened its sanctions on Iran.
Since then, tensions in the region have increased to the point where Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities are now expected. On 1 October, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel in response to a series of assassinations of prominent Iranian and Palestinian figures. This prompted further US sanctions. Israel subsequently threatened to deliver a “deadly, pinpoint accurate, and surprising” retaliation, with some Israeli officials calling for strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, including nuclear facilities. Iran, in turn has said any strike on its territory will result in massive retaliation.
Iranian parliamentarians recently called on the Supreme National Security Council to review the country’s defence doctrine to remove the ban on developing nuclear weapons. However, Iran has long prohibited nuclear weapons and Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, ratifying it in 1970. Israel, on the other hand, has refused to sign the NPT.
US officials reportedly have urged Israel not to target Iran’s energy or nuclear facilities, hoping to avoid a major regional war in the run up to the US presidential election. Following the recent very limited Israeli attack on Iran, it appears that the warning was heeded. However, whether this is the end of retaliatory strikes remains to be seen. It is also unclear how the outcome of the US election may affect future developments. Meanwhile, regional tensions continue, with Iran still taking precautions against a possible future major attack on its nuclear infrastructure.
